Patricia A. McCoy discuss this paradox in the context of the suitability rule, a rule that requires brokers only to recommend investments that best further the investors' interests, and write:
If the duty of suitability is appropriate for financial instruments that have been the traditional province of the affluent, certainly it is appropriate for financial instruments that are peddled to the poorest rung of society. 5 Professor Jonathan R. Macey explores this puzzle more generally and observes:
Kafka would have loved this story: According to our current understanding of U.S. law, there is far better consumer protection for people who play the stock market than for people who are duped into buying a house with an exotically structured subprime mortgage ... .
How, then, did the S.E.C create this anomalous regime of protections, and why did the public not protest these shelters for relatively wealthy and sophisticated consumers of financial products? In this comment, I argue that public opinion did not swell against these protections because the S.E.C tapped into a popular discourse about feminine frailty and highlighted the gender and vulnerability of the earliest victims of securities fraud. 7 To substantiate this point, I focus on the S.E.C's development of the duty of best execution. Three sections structure this comment. First, I provide historical background by documenting the rise of women investors in the early 1900s. Second, I draw on newspaper and magazine articles from this period to trace the contours of a popular discourse that framed women as inept investors and articulated a widespread narrative about these women's reliance on opportunistic stockbrokers. Third, I analyze the S.E.C opinions that created the duty of best execution to show how the S.E.C legitimated its heightened regulation.
GALLUP (May 8, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162353/stock-ownership-stays-record-low.aspx (finding that 81% of people who make over $75,000 a year own stock compared to just 21% of people who make less than $30,000 per year.).
5. 
THE RISE OF WOMEN INVESTORS
Legal and technological shifts at the turn of the twentieth century sparked a dramatic increase in the number of female investors. Following the abolition of the coverture laws, women, who struggled to find gainful employment in an economy offering few opportunities to women, demanded property. Men, who still doubted women's ability to manage property effectively, gave their wives and daughters securities because they knew that another man-most likely a stockbroker-would, in reality, control the assets. 9 The expanding influence of radio and print magazine increased women's interest in acquiring securities and improved their access to financial information. if the rate is maintained, according to one statistician, the entire wealth of the country will be in their hands by 2025."l The articles' hyperbolic predictions and use of charged words like "invasion" evinced fears about the shift's social impacts and threat of undermining the day's patriarchal system more generally.
THE NARRATIVE: INCOMPETENT WOMEN DEPEND ON OPPORTUNISTIC MEN
These articles did not merely document women's increased market presence. Instead, they presented evidence of this financial shift in a strikingly consistent normative narrative. This narrative included three elements. First, the authors argued that women were incompetent investors because they were ignorant and/or irrational. Second, the authors explained that women should depend on men for financial guidance because of their feminine incompetence. Third, the authors worried that these men, chosen to serve as financial advisors, would victimize their allegedly ignorant and irrational clients. In the following paragraphs, I resurrect this narrative by illustrating how newspapers, magazines, and books articulated its components.
Many articles used fairly general terms to portray women as inept investors. One article, for example, described women as "very bad speculators." 20 Another article compared women investors to "absentee-land-
." 2 1 A final article quoted a woman who doubted women's ability and interest in becoming successful investors: "I must say that I think it will be a long time before the average woman will make up successfully as a 'bull' or a 'bear.' The majority will be well content to let the Jasons go forth and do battle for the Golden Fleece."
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Other articles used more precise language and argued that women were incompetent investors because they were inherently ignorant of finance and business generally. In a 1902 article, the New York Times quoted a broker who observed, "The average woman knows little about brokerage. Business instinct is not innate in the woman . . . ."23 The author of a 1910 investment guide for women agreed and began his guide by explaining, "In my experience as a practising [sic] lawyer, no one fact has been more strongly impressed upon me than that the majority of American women are almost entirely ignorant of the ordinary rules and methods of business. Other writers attributed women's alleged incompetence to their irrationality. In presenting women as irrational, these journalists followed in a long tradition of Western thought.26 A 1927 Independent article, which discussed the increasing importance of female investors, implored its readers to recognize the "social import" of these "revelations" because " [w] omen are much more sentimental than men."27 A 1926 New York Times article adopted the same perspective and quoted a broker generalizing, " [W] omen are the biggest gamblers."28 Similarly, a 1929 article noted, "When a woman gets going in the stock market her daring is said to surpass that of a man . . . . [S]he will go so far as to risk thousands because she has set her mind on making a few more hundreds."29 Others outside of the New York Times also regarded women as inherently irrational and talentless investors. J. George Frederick wrote in his 1930 book titled Common Stocks and the Average Man, "Quite obviously, however, women are somewhat less competent to use their own judgment in investment than men. It is not unfair to say that they have not the same coolness of judgment, as a rule, as men." Other commentators adopted a more prescriptive stance and argued that ignorant and irrational. women should depend on their mostly male stockbrokers. In his 1908 classic, Henry Clews analogized independent female investors to doomed ships and wrote, " [Women] are like a ship at sea in a heavy gale without compass, anchor or rudder. They have no ballast apart from men, and are liable to perish when adversity arises." 33 J. When the S.E.C., in deciding a number of cases, read the rule of best execution-a rule requiring brokers to sell and buy securities on behalf of investors at the most efficient prices-into section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 15(c)(1) of the Securities and Exchange Act,46 it followed the legislators' cue and played into the narrative described above. Many of these earlier decisions highlighted the victimized investor's gender and evoked this narrative in a number of ways. In In re Charles Hughes & Co., an early articulation of the shingle theory-a predecessor to the duty of best execution-the S.E.C. called three female witnesses and asked each to introduce herself as a housewife.
47 By choosing only female witnesses and by encouraging these women to draw attention to their gender by emphasizing their identities as "housewives," the S.E.C. prepared the public to accept its increased regulation by subtly reminding the public of the many defenseless women victimized by securities fraud. The strategy appears to have succeeded. On appeal, the appellate court reemphasized the gender of the investors and wrote, "The customers were almost entirely single women or widows who knew little or nothing about securities or the devices of Wall Street." 48 A New
York Times article published shortly after the Second Circuit decision also focused on the victims' gender by quoting the appellate court's decision and by writing in bold letters set off from the rest of the text, "Buyers Nearly All uninformed in securities matters".
In In re Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629 (1948) , the S.E.C. called two witnesses to explain how an opportunistic stockbroker took advantage of them. The S.E.C. opinion described these two witnesses-the only witnesses mentioned in the opinion-as "a housewife" and "also a housewife."
53 This same opinion, however, never mentioned the gender of the defendant, Arleen Hughes. The fact that the S.E.C. opinion highlighted the victims' gender and underplayed the defendant's gender suggests that the combination of being both victims and women made the witness' gender particularly salient. Dec. 11, 1943, at 20. 50 . 1 came to this conclusion by reading through the twenty-three cases on Westlaw decided between 1940 and 1950 that mention the words "securities" and "fraud."
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In re Lawrence R. Leeby & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-3450, 13 S.E.C. 499, 499 (June 26, 1943 ) ("Where respondent broker-dealer sold oil royalty interests at retail prices bearing no reasonable relationship to the contemporaneous wholesale price, and no circumstances appear warrating [sic] the excessive mark-ups charged, held there is an inherent misrepresentation as to the fair price of the security, and a fraud upon the purchaser, in violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.").
52.
In re May & Phinney, Doing Bus, as May-Phinney Co. & Wash. Nat'l Co., 27 S.E.C. 814, 821-31 (1948) ("Where registered broker-dealer, in the purchase of securities from and sale of securities to customers whose confidence he had gained and for whom he acted as agent, obtained secret profits by selling such securities at prices greatly exceeding his cost and current market prices, held, willful violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule thereunder.").
53.
In re Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 629 (Feb. 18, 1948) ("Where registered broker-dealer, who is also a registered investment adviser, sells her own securities to clients to whom she purportedly renders impartial investment advice and fails to disclose fully to such clients the nature and extent of her adverse interest, including her cost of the securities and the best price at which the security might be execution. Lacking the polish of a federal agency's decision, Birch uses insulting and hyperbolic language to describe the female plaintiffs ignorance. The opinion described her as "densely ignorant" and "in a constant state of confusion" and noted that "she did not know whether she was buying securities directly from the defendant, or, through them as brokers, from others, nor, when selling, whether she was selling directly to them, or through them to others." 56 In the most infantilizing portion of the opinion, the S.E.C. described her as completely incapable of performing the most basic tasks and wrote, "She had to be shown how to cut coupons from bonds, and an employee of her bank made out her deposit slips for her." Extreme and stereotypical visions of feminine frailty and incompetence produced to some extent the problem that the S.E.C. sought to solve.
CONCLUSION
Legal and technological changes during the turn of the twentieth century radically reshaped the securities market. Women became a prevalent-if not dominant-demographic of investors. Newspaper articles and other widely read sources did not welcome women into the market. Instead, they created and proliferated a narrative that portrayed women as incompetent investors dependent on morally corrupt male stockbrokers. Congress, motivated by these fears and stereotypes, passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. In reading the duty of best execution into these laws and by repeatedly describing the victims of securities fraud as "housewives" and "widows," the newly created S.E.C. exploited these popular prejudices and fears to justify its decisions to increase protections for securities investors. By both perpetuating degrading stereotypes of women and by creating stringent consumer protection laws, legislators and the S.E.C. circuitously pursued the public good. Scholars have not fully determined this circuitous pursuit's normative valence. They have not studied the long-term effects of using these degrading stereotypes to motivate a regulatory regime. While the emotional costs remain hidden but ripe for empirical study, the regulatory costs seem immediately apparent. When these explicitly sexist visions of women faded from the public discourse, this specific regulatory regime lost one of its major justifications. As a result, scholars began to question the regime's legitimacy and wondered why it afforded so many protections to such sophisticated consumers. Thus, at a more general level, this process suggests that regulatory 
